The article is devoted to the studies the problems of interpretations and representations of the concept of “sense” in logical semantics, which has been analyzed by the outstanding American philosopher and mathematician of the middle and a second half of the XX century – Willard Van Orman Quine, who has snooped far enough into the presented problem in numerous of his works, mainly, his “Word and Object” and “From a Logical Point of View”. The central critical theories of understanding Quine’s thought of the sense is seen at another angle, that is, as a main concept that gets some responds of the philosophers in post-analytical philosophy tradition, along with it is reviewed as a broadly interpreted concept. Additionally, modes of such critique can be found as in some classic works of the philosophers like D. Davidson or M. Dummett, or as of such modern analytical philosophers as: M. Baghramian, L. Komacha, P. Livingston, J. Smith, and others.

About this material few modern works and Quine’s as well have been particularly researched, and of our opinion, the movement of such explanation of the sense problem in Quine’s works keeps coming to be emphasized in today's philosophy. We result this work on that the critique of the sense in Quine’s works hadn’t been done the way perfectly: not enough enlightened though. Hereby we claim to keep monitoring and not to stop studying of the metaphysical context of works and cultural as well. The better that point becomes to get larger area to study the more successful the research is expected.

That way of criticizing half-metaphysical concepts aimed as a method, on the one hand, is required for a more advanced investigations of the proliferation in post-analytical philosophy works, and, on the other hand, as a reason of ideas and views separation, which are not relevant to the traditional analytic philosophy, is taken and viewed using examples. New critique of few aspects of Quine’s philosophy are necessary to get closer to the as the philosopher’s ideas to the newest ideas for the development of the science as well. Many key and well points can be gotten from the way to analyze the works. Interpretations of meaning of the concept of sense in the different papers of analytical philosophers is supposed to change the key direction of the considered this topic.

**Key words:** naturalistic epistemology, sense, formal semantics, analytical philosophy.

**Problem statement** of a given article is revealed that in nowadays the study of American and European philosophy in Ukraine, and mainly, traditional and post-analytical philosophies, may serve a powerful background to haste the process of integration to the modern global society for few present reasons, and for making this process be more rational, sequenced, and thoughtful as an uprising way of studying, research and assimilation of the experience of the formation of the global civilized community. All of this and more requires a broad and step-by-step deeper moves of investigation of the conceptual foundations of the development of the
modern civilized world. Moreover, the last decade the processes of the integration had started to perform in the actual progress, whilst those times few modern researchers of as traditional so post-analytical philosophy lately appeared in Ukrainian philosophy.

One of such persons, who absorbs the whole variety of too many aspects to be worth and productive to study is without a hesitation Willard Van Orman Quine, the American philosopher from the middle and last half of the XX century. Among the others he had become a true rock-star considering the number of the citations of him, and how far and enormous his influence to the temporary and the modern philosopher he had done. As we pointed that out in our last article [5] that “the richest and most diverse of them is G. Frege’s concept of meaning. In the program work “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung” [5, p. 105] plenty central and important themes come from the traditional cut of the philosophers founded that tradition, and G. Frege’s notion of sense is the head one. Already his work demonstrates clearly that number of questions, the take of which in the analytic philosophy deepened in various works of other philosophers and logicians. The concept survived and obtained its contours through the pages of such philosophers as B. Russell, M. Schlick, and R. Carnap [4, p. 4], heading that important point of the Frege’s term to its philosophical corners as it occurs in W.V.O. Quine’s philosophy.

**Analysis of recent researches** take the presented research is demonstrated by a number of works: D. Davidson and M. Dummel [2], as it was mentioned above, emphasized the problem with language aspect, and logical inquiry as well, and in the works of which is devoted to the study of the debate about adverbs, the nature of names, etc; the work [11] presents several chapters, which are devoted to both an overview of the basic concept of meaning and its continuation in the logical-semantic plane; in the work [1] notes on how the rudiments of the reality in the modes of naturalised epistemology influence on the view of the meaning, so does the sense; further translation of the concept of meaning through the conceptual outlines of its contextual application in the formal analysis of logical structures can be found in [6]; And the most closes to the systematizing of the metaphysical background of the formal use of the concept of sense in [10] has been reviewed.

**The paper objective** is to view key aspects of the sense in the Quine’s philosophy via its critique to reveal its blankness and fuzziness in his interpretation of the concept, mostly, in his interpretation of the concept of meaning.

The new in this work is due to the lack of additional coverage as in Ukrainian philosophy so in others is the revision and explicit presentation of the Quine’s topic for traditional and post-analytical philosophy. It’s the undercover philosophical interpretations of the development of this idea in analytical branch, in particular, the legacy of the founders of the analytical tradition. Nevertheless, over the past ten years, the scope of the study within the analytical tradition has been mentioned not once, as in the very fact in some of the works as of L. Komacha [3], and A. Sinytsia [11]. (Must be added that it keeps going publish in textbooks and other works for students).

The tasks of this article are as follows: to present Quine’s program for the implementation of the idea of debunking the logic of sense, to present separate opinions about the analysis of the translation of the central concept idea of the sense, and to analyze their views on the subject of the presence of both a common goal and different views, as well as, distinguish the components of the conceptualization method and demonstrate it in his rewriting of its theory. So, firstly this question was raised by G. Frege, asking what changes after changing the variables in few similar propositions, and by that was revealed a more complex structure of synchronomical propositions, thus Quine was going to grasp that aspect of understanding, and our goal is to view it, mentioning some metaphysical gaps in those thoughts.

**Main body** of this work is the firstly applied some unusual interpretations of the concept of sense in Quine’s philosophy, mainly in order to get this concept closer to the metaphysical bases of as implication side, so any principles Quine had been put to it in his works. (The analysis of the method of such conceptualization and its problems had been studied in a more detail way in our previous articles.) Numerous comparisons of the ideas or secondary representatives of the sense in analytical philosophy lets viewing this problem in a broader way.

Quine’s naturalised epistemology supposes the way of representing objects for the realists of different sorts into one category of restriction their plural conceptualizations to its core aspects. His program of criticizing the way philosophers observe the nature is correlating with: a) his logical arguing against analytic propositions, and b) his postulating of the wholeness theories based on any conclusion of meaning. Contrary to remarks of [3] and [1] to this aspect of the naturalised aspect we think any attempts to shake Quine’s intentions are being broken via his way of presenting and representing of the more general image about his philosophy. As such it seems what Quine’s drawing for us is that he’s trying to say sporadically in his works about terms and determinations, as “truth is a dequantation” [8], so some others we mention further. The American philosopher divides the types of theories due to the logical sentences’ aspect, whilst break the present view on the positivistic analysis of propositions out. So, the idea of the meaning and the sense as well grasps all those sentences that can be said to be true or, otherwise, included in the set of entities A, or those that can be said to be false or belong to the set of entities opposite to A. In addition to such sentences, there are also sentences that only denote something. But Quine doubts all of that.

His version of the naturalized epistemology put forward a thought of any possible rearrangements in the conceptual models. We might be doubting whether or not he insists on such a view, however his thoughts on the modal aspect of it make it be clearer, he posts a paradoxical example for many versions of the modal logic “9>7, thus the number of planets>7” [7] asking, what changes can help us here not attempting to get it into the formal semantics? The answer is that this problem is similar to the problem of dividing analytical and syntethetical statements. A sentence can represent itself with the help of meaning. This is illustrated by a number of examples in linguistics mathematics.
In G. Frege’s way it was an object, say the planet Venus, and its historical synonym, namely the Evening Star and the Morning Star, then, using these linguistic equivalents in sentences, we will continue to speak of the planet Venus. Frege pointed out that from sentences like "The morning star is the Morning Star" or "The Evening Star is the Evening Star" we get no information, while the sentence "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" we get new information [11, p. 178]. The attached component is a meaningful element. Quine, on the other hand emphasized another background of it.

For Quine any instantiation into the language form par excellence are not complete synonyms. Despite how Quine intended to illustrate it, using his examples with the term “bachelor” we’ll try to short this saying only that any new word may hide a new information in it. That is why the same idea or the same thought, that is being constantly repeating in some poetry with the plenty of various forms of the same name (as it occurs with the sequenced adjectives), circulates differently. Hence, unlike Carnap (that truly mentioned about that point in [10]) the sense or the idea of Quine may be presented in a different way. And here’s another point that explains why the American philosopher turned his thoughts onto pragmatism.

Considering a thought in which a set of changes in sentences from the previous paragraph has been rotated or instantiated with synonyms forms into the next one: “a linguist the researcher hears ‘gavagai’ and attaches it to ‘a rabbit’, the tribe member this time considers ‘a running rabbit’ by this word” [9] must be translated by us as an idea that the model – or the representing reality – turns unexpectedly different in any case of changing or replacing the variables. That is why there appears that important different Quine is trying to underline it in this mentioned book of him “Mathematical Logic” with such a fierce force. Given a formula with variables already makes the situation with the world be warned. Let us describe this thought in a more explicit way.

What Quine is doing is the way of telling us that the analyticity of sentences with variables are different depending of which semantic form it occupies. If in a certain math formula \(F(x)\), \(\exists F(x)\), or \(\forall F(x)\) variables are varying not a quite lightly. In those three ones the first has the free variable, however that helps us to establish any real functional consideration between sets. In such a case \(x = y\), \(y = \text{some } f\), and therefore ‘\(x\) is some \(f\)’ for a chosen model in a drawn tablet will be correct for the correct replacement. Here is the same: the free variables let our ability of usage math or the representing reality – turns immediately this formula either to \(\exists F(x)\), or \(\forall F(x)\). That is why the most famous Quine’s quote among the other from his article “On What There Is” reads as “existence is a function of a bounded variable” [9]. Indeed, only bounded variables – and some propositional forms as well – may get that form aspect.

We find this point of Quine to be less clear. Also, some hesitations about that point is seen in [6] of the correct usage of “the sense” for overall or total case, and in [10] by doubting it via the opposite way of representing the concept sense, while we are going to tell more on it down below. Here we want to repeat our point of that way how Quine had been doubting the difference between analytic and synthetic statements. In particular, it must be obvious that except for language appearance of symbolic nature there is the logical one. And in this way the doubt of it led to the attempts of doubting logic, that is not the case for epistemology circle only, but it swallows the metaphysical way in, so let us illustrate it as an attempt to doubt logic itself.

Logic may be whatever, so for the best possible answer we can just assume that whatever logic is let it be just a class of \(L\), where \(L\) supposes all what logic must have. In this way we may ask what exactly \(L\) has, or which elements belongs to it? And of course, none of answers as ‘anything that is logical’ won’t help us, because such a way leads to the endless circularity. Therefore, all we have to assume is that \(L\) can be viewed as something that enough to get anything into logic, or in other words, if \(L\) is logical, then \(L\) is enough to prove that such a sentence \(x\) that holds the elements which belong to \(L\). Clear to see that ‘such a sentence \(x\) that holds the elements which belong to \(L\)’ belongs to \(L\), so such a class according to Russell [7] is closed. And as soon as we ask about any open classes as for deities not belonging to \(L\) we will automatically get the famous Russell’s paradox version for the close form of the open classes. Briefly, if a certain int is illogical or it doesn’t belong to \(L\) we don’t know anything about int whether or not it belongs to \(L\) or to anything else. We consider this examples may explain why any metaphysical level appears on that logical level of higher degrees of criticizing the present subject.

In addition to meaning and sense in sentences, Quine also distinguishes representation and denotation. He says that he prefers to Russell’s aspect of that inquiry. The latter coincide with the meaning that enables Quine to construct an ontology through the separate reality of the true and false one’s entities, thus turning their system into a Platonic variant of metaphysics. So, imagination depends on a concept or a group of concepts that can have the same or different names. For example, the imagination of the referent of the name “Pegasus” may be mythical, but, at the same time, it may not be mythical – in the case that the name denotes a specific existing object with such a name. An equally important role in the presented theory of the American philosopher is played by names or designations: names symbolize their own meaning.

The problematic issue of the representation of objects (or their reference) concerns the metaphysical approach to the definition of so-called types and tokens - elements that either accept or reject the possibility of being indexed [4]. This concept is connected by Quine with something purely basic, however, this rather characterizes quite a narrow reason of this problem in that key that any critique about the concept of sense is more or less modeled by some spare and beyond reasons as, for instance, the simplicity. We’re going to explain this relation between the main concept and its metaphysical background starting from one of the providing, as it’s opinionated, foundation for that holistic point the American philosopher had been discussing in many of his works [8].

One of the key aspect in simplicity can be shown as the next one: 1) \(p\) is prefarable to \(q\) if and only if \(p\) is
simpler, than q; 2) there's a criteria r such that p for r times simpler, than q. Among these two requirements we may choose one, however none of these are enough to decide whether or no p is simpler, than q. For the reason to introduce how the sense is related to this, let's firstly formally assume that somehow a thought about the simplicity is reasoned, and, thus, has the sense. Formal semantics allow us to skip any detalizations for the time being. Getting back of the case of ours, we may suppose a set of models such that none of given requirement satisfies it. Again, formally this must be like that: \( \langle M, \gamma \rangle \neq S \), where for a set of individuals M, S is any formal system, and \( \gamma \) is a set of rules for M to applies it on S.

There's such a model: \( \langle M, \gamma \rangle \neq \{x|f(x)\text{ is simplier, than q}\}; \langle M, \gamma \rangle \neq (p)(p\text{ is simple}) \). The reason for such system to fail is in any attempt to imply simplicity from any models, and in particular the given one. We must know that for any number of axioms A in the proposes system S, then the number of the axioms are either formally, or informally argued, but either case we don't know the criteria to establish these or not these axioms A, and for that our choise of A is deliberate. So, both requirements (1) and (2) are irrelevant to explain what makes a system to be simple. We can't rely neither on the quality, because such a step supposes only introduction of another term, while this violates the conditions, nor on a certain calculate function, that can't rely on itself for the determination of the simplicity. In other words, such a system never be completed.

Another point that we have to view here in briefly, although we're going to discuss in details it in further articles, considers another metaphysical element for the systems, in particular, the systems that has the sense in it (or the elements of it have), such as the implication of sense. If previously we dealt with the simplicity, this aspect of the problem must have been seen as the root of the question about the foundations of the given problem. Hence, we're going to observe four possible logical dimentions of what the sense is. Quine is seemed to skip this step in his methods, when he prefers the method of B. Russell called the descriptive analysis. We assume that any precise look at the core logical side of implication to be one of the central in the question of metaphysics of logic.

It's possible to assume that the sense as a problematic concept may be presented via four key aspects as being a thought, a implication, a part of the whole, or a deliberate one. Starting from Frege a thought had been viewing primarily as a central element for what sense is, but we must admit the complexity of it relying to it that if the sense is a thought, then why some thoughts are senseless? Another point is a logical aspect, that is seen as a requirement for one step to make another one; here is to assume that the implication makes one proposition to get another one. This moves to the problem of cause-relation, and the metaphysical element and the complexity of it is clear. Two last dimentions introduce that either sense supposes a creator context, or not; if it is a part of the whole, then there must be found such an L that — and the previous thoughts of ours about the nature of logic is relevant here. But if there is no connection, and the sense is beyond of L, then we don't know yet how to grasp it. Said above is enough to make this question deserves more broad metaphysical views. About some other key points of Quine's critique of sense, we observe down below.

In addition, it should be added that Quine’s theory preserves the possibility of single naming, or preserving the indexing of names, and thanks to this, in the construction of his logical calculation, the presence of only one denotation for each individual constant must be considered true. Guided by the same principle, sense and truth, as well as sense and meaning, must be separated not only functionally, but also through the method of analysis.

Thus, in addition to a purely logical consideration of Quine’s concept of sense, one cannot fail to note the need to single out cultural-historical analysis as well, the neglect of which makes it impossible to see a full-fledged consideration of any complete, meaningful picture of reality.

The critical approach will be considered as able to convincingly explain the criterion of the paradigm of our research object. Confidence in the implementation of this method lies in the essence of the social approach to this issue, that is, the fact that discussions and shortcomings are mostly revealed sui generis in the social plane. And, that is why it is obviously appropriate to consider at least four of the most significant critical positions regarding the use of the concept of meaning in Frege's works, and in this way to present the methodological side of this issue.

That is why any critique of the sense of words and expressions of some language is certain by the rules of sense demanding from each (everyone) using language, certain behavior concerning a recognition of offers of this language in those or other situations. The one who do not follow it, does not connect also the sense which is found out in the given semantic link. Given the system of senses an essence the same, as the conceptual apparatus makes the metaphysical inquiries only more available and advanced. The definition of the concept sense offers by us as a term "sense" (quoted), leads to far-reaching consequences. It may lead to the epistemological position which we name the conventionalism [5].

Another opinion we would like to add here is that regarding the concept of meaning belongs to R. Carnap, the author of the method of intentional and extensional, and a person who continues to study the Frege’s concept. So, according to him sense is clear watching nonsense. The last one doesn’t fight against any metaphysics naming the only “more weaker forms of scientific language, less preferable to mathematics” [Quine, 1980]. Contrary to him Carnap sharply postulated that any semantical differences led to mistakes. This can be seen in such an example as “Julius Cesar is x; x is a prime number; therefore, Julius Cesar is a prime number” which is wrong [11 p. 113]. But again we face here the same we have seen with an example of the attempt of doubting the logic. This method of critique makes it possible to unambiguously understand and distribute the intentionality of dispositions and extensionals here. While the descriptive methods, which are preferred by Quine is the project of developing a tool for formalizing sentences, the Carnap’s is just a technique of semantically adequate creation to the language of natural sciences which make becomes possible.
Conclusions. Having analyzed the critical views in the four above concepts of meaning, we note that only consideration of Quine’s concept a fortiori allows this very idea to continue to transform or change in the direction of the possibility of applying the original concept in the development of metaphysics. Another point is that Quine’s idea of dividing positivistic views turns into a way of appearance of the metaphysical level. Deriving a thought for the constructing of systems with the example with modeling we reveal the aspect of implication that is required, and that the systems must be viewed metaphysically. That followed to the question of the nature of implication, where all the four cases had been introduced the complexity for any attempts of the critic of sense. So, the critique of Quine of the sense doesn’t get its overall and total project in further investigations of the analytic philosophy.

References

Відомості про авторів / About the Authors
Hlushchenko Vyacheslavovych (Глушченко Євгеній В'ячеславович) – National Technical University "Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute", a senior lecturer of the Department of Philosophy, graduate student; Kharkiv, Ukraine; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0262-5798

УДК 130.2: 355.1
doi: 10.20998/2227-6890.2022.2.05

B.I. MIЩЕНКО

ІНТЕЛЕКТУАЛЬНІСТЬ ОСОБИСТОСТІ В УМОВАХ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ДО ПЛАНЕТАРНО-КОСМІЧНОЇ ЦИВІЛІЗАЦІЇ

Автором розглянуто причини процесів деінтелектуалізації суспільства, пов’язаних із впливом техногенної цивілізації, суспільства масового споживання, інформаційного суспільства. Враховуючи важливість інтелектуалізації особистості, звернено увагу на те, що сам термін використовується функціонально, як здібність використовувати інтелект у тих або інших ситуаціях, а не як внутрішній стрижень духовного образу особистості. Обґрунтовано саме такий розгляд інтелектуалізму у зв’язку з необхідністю функціонування сучасної посткласичної науки, а також дослідженням великих складно організованих систем, здатних до самоорганізації. З метою формалізації концепту інтелектуалізації розглянуто структурні елементи (нософерність, аналітичність, інтелігентність, креативність, евристичність, цивілізованість, інтелігентність, самостійність, позитивність, життєтверджуючий характер), особливості прояву інтелектуалізму в різних сферах діяльності особистості, рівні розвитку інтелектуалізму. Доведено, що необхідність досягнення ще інших рівнів інтелектуалізації (еволюційного, глобального креативного, духовного) пов’язується з необхідністю вживання цивілізації на стадії трансформації до планетарно-космічної, використання ресурсів технотронної цивілізації, створення інтелектуально-моральної духовності.

Ключові слова: інформаційне суспільство, інтелектуалізм, особистість, цивілізація, духовність, інтелігентність, еволюція.

VI. MISHCHENKO

PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONDITIONS OF TRANSFORMATION TO A PLANETARY-SPACE CIVILIZATION

The author considered the causes of the processes of de-intellectualization of society associated with the influence of man-made civilization, mass consumption society, and information society. Considering the importance of intellectualization of the individual, attention is paid to the fact that the term itself is used functionally, as the ability to use the intellect in certain situations, and not as the inner core of the spiritual image of the individual. Such consideration of intellectuality is substantiated in connection with the need for the functioning of modern post-classical science, as well as the study of large, complexly organized systems capable of self-organization. In order to formalize